Part II: Institutionalising Social Performance 5. Simple Standards or Burgeoning Benchmarks? Institutionalising Social Performance Monitoring, Assessment and Auditing of Microfinance by Copestake, James
Part II:
Institutionalising
Social
Performance
5. Simple
Standards or
Burgeoning
Benchmarks?
Institutionalising
Social
Performance
Monitoring,
Assessment and
Auditing of
Microfinance
James Copestake
1. Introduction1
Assessment of financial performance of
microfinance organisations (MFOs) is far from
perfect, but it is fair to say that it is
institutionalised.2 Rules and norms govern these
activities sufficiently strongly that: (a) almost
nobody questions why it should be done, and (b)
agreed standards and routines govern how. The key
question to be explored here is whether it would be
desirable to achieve a similar degree of
institutionalisation for goal setting, monitoring,
assessment and auditing of the social performance
of MFOs, and if so how to go about it. Social
performance refers mainly to the direct impact
(physical, social, economic, political, cultural,
psychological) that MFOs have on the activities
and well-being of users of their services. But wider
impact, on other family members, employees,
business associates, competitors, neighbours, those
excluded from using services, and institutions
governing society more generally, are also
important. Thus social performance also includes
the impact of microfinance on poverty.
The terminology of financial and social
performance of an organisation is linked in turn to
the concept of the “double bottom line”, and the
view that MFOs should aim at becoming both
viable commercial organisations and catalysts of
social development (Tulchin 2003). This is a bold
but fragile dream, easily subverted by populists
and cynics alike. The view taken here is that
generalisation about overall impact of
microfinance, or lack of it, matters less than small
steps in the right direction. This includes steps
towards institutionalising a hard-headed culture of
learning how to improve social performance, both
within MFOs and across the microfinance
industry/community.
The term “social performance” echoes the recurrent
preoccupation within public policy with defining
goals, assessing performance against those goals,
and ensuring that there are strong feedback or
performance management systems to help
organisations monitor, reflect upon and improve
practice. But, given the diversity and complexity of
MFOs, it is important that striving for consistency,
both within and between MFOs, is reconciled with
the need for flexibility. For example, greater
consistency in measuring the poverty of clientsIDS Bulletin Vol 34 No 4 2003
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would be welcome, but not if one indicator
becomes too dominant a criterion by which social
performance of all MFOs is judged. The general
problem is to avoid unthinking replication of what
is naively regarded as universal best practice. For
example, the Grameen Bank has recently been
through a quite radical process of “re-engineering”
(Yunus 2002), but other MFOs may be right to opt
for more gradual change.
Benchmarks set standards of good practice to
which members of a peer reference group are
encouraged to aspire. They vary widely in scope
and ambition. At one extreme a benchmark may
consist of little more than a checklist of questions
against which an organisation can be assessed. But
benchmarks may also help to bring about greater
clarity and consistency in definition of terms,
measurement of indicators, methods for evaluating
performance against agreed yardsticks, and systems
of quality assurance. The concept is already
established in microfinance with respect to
financial performance (see especially MiX 2002),
where the scope for agreement on quantitative
standards are greater. But the idea of agreeing on a
more general social performance benchmark is also
advancing rapidly (see Zeller et al. 2003).
A benchmark has the potential to increase
efficiency, quality and transparency of a peer group
or network of organisations (Copestake 2002a).
However, the tool also carries with it real dangers.
For example, benefits can be outweighed by the
costs of setting up, monitoring and complying
with it (Power 1997). Benchmarks can also foster
an undesirable degree of uniformity, and be used
as a weapon by those with power to impose their
vision on others. Thus, while suggesting a rational,
technical approach to development, the process of
benchmarking is unavoidably political and risky.
Much depends upon the level of detail to which a
benchmark aspires. This article argues in favour of
keeping standards simple, thereby developing a
benchmark to which the vast majority of MFOs
can subscribe. This is compatible with an
evolutionary process of continuous improvement
in social performance based more on peer
pressure, that is likely to be more effective than
one dictated by donors, international consultants
and regulators.
Care is also needed in thinking through the
political processes by which compliance with a
benchmark is monitored and enforced. There is
little doubt that sponsors of microfinance will use
any agreed social performance benchmark to make
decisions about resource allocation. If compliance
with a benchmark can be reliably audited then it
can help to reduce the lack of clarity, cost and
inconsistency of current performance assessment
and resource allocation processes. If not, then the
benchmark can set up a conflict between better
performance and the appearance of better
performance.
A first step in developing a simple standard for
social performance of microfinance is to
distinguish between internal and external
requirements. The internal agenda is how to
institutionalise a culture of concern with social as
well as financial performance. The external agenda
is to develop systems for sharing credible evidence
about social performance with other stakeholders,
including investors, donors, and regulators. This
distinction can be clarified by comparing social and
financial performance measurement (see Table 1).
This article starts with the internal agenda. Section
2 proposes a unified framework for selection of
goals and indicators. Section 3 proposes a
minimalist system for monitoring changes in client
status, and Section 4 explores options for impact
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Table 1: Financial and social performance management compared
Internal components External components
Financial performance Accounting and financial Regulatory framework and
management control systems independent auditing
Social performance Monitoring and evaluation activities, Formal external impact assessment 
management human resource management and social performance auditing
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assessment. Section 5 starts by exploring factors
affecting the quality and effectiveness of social
performance assessment. It argues that external
stakeholders should rely less on independent
impact assessment studies, and more on periodic
audits designed to reinforce internal social
performance. The main arguments of the article are
summarised in Section 6.
2. Social performance goals
While considerable progress is being made in
standardising on indicators of the financial
performance ofMFOs, this cannot be said for social
performance. One positive aspect of this is that
organisations have more room for manoeuvre to
specify the goals and indicators that are appropriate
to them. On the other hand, much avoidable
ambiguity and confusion reigns over the precise
meaning of social performance goals, particularly
outreach and poverty reduction impact. This
section suggests a typology of social performance
goals that combines the six dimensions of outreach
originally put forward by Mark Schreiner, with a
distinction between three forms of poverty impact
suggested by Martin Greeley.
2.1 The Schreiner framework
A useful starting point here is a distinction between
six dimensions of outreach proposed by Schreiner
(2002). These are breadth, scope, depth, worth to
users, cost to users and length:
n Breadth refers to the number of people with
access to financial services at any moment in
time. Increasing breadth of outreach is almost
always an organisational goal, and one that is
relatively easily defined and measured.
n Scope refers to the nature of the service being
provided – loans, savings facilities, insurance
products, payment services, training and so on.
It should be relatively straightforward for
organisations to monitor who is using
particular services, using the same systems that
measure breadth.3
n Depth refers to the social status of users, and is
based on the view that greater social value may
be given to services provided to poorer people.
n Worth to clients refers to benefits arising from
services. Costs to clients refers to the transaction
costs (including investment of their own time)
incurred obtaining these services. Combining
these two dimensions gives net worth, or a
measure of value added to client, which is the
central concern of impact assessment.
n Length refers to the capacity of the organisation
to sustain provision of services over time.
Hence within the double bottom line
framework it falls mainly under financial rather
than social performance.
To simplify, this article suggests that a social
performance standard should include a statement
of goals and targets with respect to breadth/scope,
depth and net worth to users. The next step is then
to consider mechanisms for assessing performance
in relation to each.
2.2 The Greeley framework
Before doing so, however, it is worth considering how
this framework relates to the goal of poverty
reduction. Martin Greeley (article 1, this Bulletin) has
proposed that it may be useful to distinguish between:
n direct impact on income poverty; 
n direct impact on other dimensions of poverty; 
n wider impact on poverty.
Direct impact refers to effects on people who are
themselves clients ofMFOs, plus other members of
their household. Income poverty can be defined in
various ways, but the currently dominant approach
is to use local equivalents of the absolute ‘$1 a day’
poverty line enshrined in the Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) to halve the proportion
of people who are poor in 2015 as compared to
1990.4 An advantage of this goal is that it is precise,
universal, and links microfinance explicitly to a
broader development movement (Littlefield et al.
2003).
However, enshrining direct impact on the number
of people falling below a single income poverty line
as a prime social performance yardstick would be
hugely contentious. The long list of problems
include reliability of per capita income estimates,
their stability over time, their accuracy as a general
56
5Copestake  05/09/03  7:17 am Page 56
measure of human well-being, and the tendency to
discount income changes that do not happen to
push individuals across a single poverty line.
Turning to the second goal, other dimensions of
poverty might include food security, adequate
housing, water supply, sanitation, education, health
and personal freedoms. These are also enshrined in
the MDGs, and their inclusion in any standard
would certainly make it relevant to a wider range of
MFOs. Indicators of housing quality, water access,
education and life expectancy are often easier than
income poverty to measure, and generally more
stable over time. Personal freedom, by contrast, is
harder to measure in a standard way. However,
given its historical and ongoing importance to
microfinance – particularly the goal of women’s
empowerment – and indeed to the MDG, it
certainly needs to be included (Kabeer 2003).
The third goal – wider impact on poverty – includes
job creation and the formation of community
support networks, and is particularly important for
organisations that do not necessarily aim to provide
services for the poor, even if they are committed to
poverty reduction. Incorporating wider impacts
poses additional challenges for social performance
benchmarking. They are not only likely to take more
time to appear but also to be harder to attribute to the
influence of just one organisation. This suggests that
responsibility for measuring wider impacts should be
a collaborative effort between different MFOs.
2.3 Synthesis
It is fairly straightforward to combine the Schreiner
and Greeley frameworks into a single typology of
social performance goals. This is summarised in
Table 2. The table also indicates the next step –
namely specification of how performance goals are
to be assessed. This synthesis provides a single set of
concepts capable of reflecting the diverse goals of
different organisations. Some MFOs may choose to
align closely to the MDG by emphasising S2.1 and
S2.1. Others may take a different view, but can still
be accommodated: commitment to absolute poverty
reduction is something that should be secured
through persuasion not donor coercion. The
framework also allows that the causal chain linking
financial services to poverty is genuinely complex,
especially when importance is attached to capacity
to reduce future poverty as well as current poverty.
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Table 2: An overarching framework for specifying social performance goals?
Dimension(s) of outreach Performance goal(s) How to measure?
[Length] Organisational sustainability (i.e. financial Financial accounting
performance goals) system
S1. Breadth and scope S1.1 Number of savers in a given period Routine monitoring
S1.2 Number of active borrowers in a given period reports
S1.3 Users of other services etc
S2. Depth S2.1 Proportion of users within an agreed See Section 3
definition of income poverty
S2.2 Proportion of users within other socio-
demographic categories linked to poverty and 
social exclusion
S3. Net worth S3.1 Net direct contribution to income poverty See Section 4
reduction
S3.2 Net contribution to non-income measures 
of poverty and exclusion
S3.3 Other direct impacts
S3.4 Wider impact on poverty
S3.5 Other wider impacts
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3. Monitoring depth of outreach
The issue discussed in this section is how to track
the socio-economic and demographic characteristics
of users of different services over time. In retrospect,
it is surprising how slow many MFOs have been to
put in place systems for monitoring such basic
variables as age, sex, education, location and loyalty
of their clients. But this is changing as increased
competition forces organisations to be more client-
centred in order to adapt to their needs (Woller
2002). Peer pressure to monitor not only these
variables but also poverty/depth of outreach has
long been central to the campaign of theMicrocredit
Foundation. However, the US government has
added further impetus by taking steps to require
MFOs to track the poverty status of clients as a
condition for future funding from USAID.
Debate continues about how this can be done. One
approach, exemplified by the Consultative Group to
Assist the Poorest (CGAP) Poverty Assessment Tool,
separates the task from operations by delegating it
to specialised consultants. An important limitation
of this approach is that unless MFOs are prepared to
repeat the exercise periodically it generates only an
occasional and expensive snapshot of depth of
outreach. Continuous poverty status monitoring is
more likely to be based on routinely collected data.
ACCION (2002), for example, is using income and
expenditure data collected as part of the procedure
for appraisal of individual loans. A major challenge
here is to ensure that data collected is sufficiently
accurate and is comparable with benchmark
national surveys.
A more cost-effective alternative is to rely for
poverty monitoring on one or a few proxy poverty
indicators that are less demanding to measure than
income or expenditure. This approach can then be
supplemented with periodic sample-based research
into how strongly the indicators correlate with
income-based and other measures. Freedom From
Hunger (FFH), for example, is piloting an approach
based on relatively simple questions about food
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Table 3: Possible framework for classification of the poverty status of clients
A. Higher B. Middle C. Lower
Labour market Stable salaried employment Limited employment, but Casual and/or unskilled
participation or good employment secure claims on other employment. Limited
prospects household members with formal education
stable employment
Physical assets Diverse – especially own Some – including Very few – hand-to-
dwelling household goods and mouth existence
business capital
Savings and credit Direct access to regulated Maybe a savings account. Unbanked. Reliant on 
savings and credit services But saving has a high informal services
opportunity cost
Social and cultural Diversified social networks, Intermediate. Scope for Dependent on informal 
resources and forms of security against diversification away from sources of patronage as 
shocks dependence on a single security against shocks,
patron often on exploitative 
terms
Vulnerability Low – diversified portfolio High – overwhelming fear Medium/high – but at 
of resources through which of falling back into low cost of loss of 
to manage shocks group (e.g. through autonomy (“security 
separation or illness) through servitude”)
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security, while CASHPOR5 has pioneered the use of
housing and household asset indices.
Collection of such data should generally be
integrated into the same management information
system that monitors breadth and scope of
outreach. In addition to choice of indicators,
practical issues include: whether to collect the
information routinely for all clients or only a
sample; whether to use staff for the job; how
frequently to repeat the exercise; and how to
ensure data is reported in a way that is useful.
Addressing these questions requires that a difficult
balance be struck between cost, timeliness,
reliability, adequacy and usefulness. Many systems
seek to collect and analyse too much information,
with the result that they are (a) too expensive to be
sustained, and (b) too complex, confusing and
cumbersome to influence management decisions
effectively. A minimalist norm should therefore be
to collect information on at least one indicator, but
to do so regularly, sustainably and effectively.
Given the current level of experimentation and
innovation with indicators, it is premature to
propose that one or even a range of indicators
should become standard for monitoring client
status. However, there is perhaps scope for
strengthening standards for the way such data is
used. This does not refer to the controversial issue
of poverty targeting, but to the effectiveness of
reporting systems through which client status is
reported to management for operational and
strategic purposes.
To illustrate, the remainder of this section sets out a
minimalist model. As an alternative to systems based
on a single objective poverty proxy, the illustration
also relies on a simple three-fold poverty
classification made by staff. Reliance on staff in this
way has the advantage of encouraging them to find
out more about the poverty status of clients, and to
do so in a transparent yet easily quantifiable way. It
need not be costly, because staff should know much
of the information anyway. In addition, the quality of
data is enhanced to the extent that they understand
its relevance to the MFO’s social goals, and see it
being used to influence policy and practice.
Table 3 draws a distinction between just three
categories of client, with the three categories given
deliberately neutral labels (A=Upper, B=Middle,
C=Lower). The multiple criteria used are only
illustrative and could be adapted to specific social
contexts. Staff might be asked to classify clients
into one of these three groups when they first join,
at regular periods thereafter and upon leaving. The
distribution of clients in each category can then be
monitored through cross-tabulation against other
routinely collected data: group, area, name of field
officer, branch, gender of client, age of client, age of
group, length of membership of group, for
example. The most useful cross-tabulations could
then be generated routinely and changes
monitored over time.
Whether these or other categories are chosen, the
differences between them should facilitate thinking
about how financial products can be matched to
client characteristics. For example, an organisation
might emphasise its role in provision of either
protectional finance (stopping clients falling from A
to B, or from B to C) or promotional finance
(helping them rise from C to B, or from B to A).
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Table 4: Illustrative monitoring report based on a single indicator
Per cent of clients Distribution of clients by category in Period 2
present in Period 1
A=Higher B=Middle C=Lower Exited Totals
Distribution Higher 15 5 0 0 20
of clients by Middle 15 26 5 4 50
category in Lower 0 10 15 5 30
Period 1 New 0 6 4 0 10
Totals 30 47 24 9 110
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Table 4 provides a hypothetical example of the
kind of routine information that could be
generated, in the form of a mobility matrix which
compares changes in client categorisation over a
one-year period. It reveals the following
information:
n Client exit was 12 per cent over the year, but
new entry was 10 per cent of the base year
number. Hence there was a small net decrease
in breadth of outreach;
n Those leaving and entering were in the bottom
and middle categories;
n Of those who were clients in both periods, 56
per cent remained in the same category
whereas 25 per cent improved and 10 per cent
went down one category.
The same reporting format could equally be used
for monitoring a classification of clients based on
housing, educational attainment, average savings,
self-reported household income or clients’ own
assessment of their well-being. Likewise, it could
easily be produced for sub-groups of the total client
population, including gender, age, and branch
area. Production of reports by branch and field
officer can also serve a quality control function.
It is important to emphasise that routine client
monitoring of this kind does not itself constitute
evidence of impact. For example, the net
improvement in client status observed above (25
per cent better off, 10 per cent worse off) could
reflect a general improvement in the economy.
However, such information does provide a useful
basis for generation of hypotheses about impact. It
also clearly identifies the extent to which changing
client status arises from entry and exit; a factor that
often complicates interpretation of changes in
social indicators.
4. Assessing net worth to users
(impact assessment)
Impact assessment (IA) is here defined broadly as
activities intended to provide evidence of net
worth, or quality of outreach, to clients as well as
wider impacts. Information on breadth, scope and
depth of outreach is of little value without at least
some information on the extent to which use of
services has also been of lasting benefit. A
minimalist approach to IA might comprise only of
routine assessment of client exit, on the
assumption that those who remain reveal at least
some positive preference for the MFO (Copestake
2003a). However, for most MFOs, there are also
good grounds for eliciting some feedback from
loyal clients, and for conducting research into
wider impacts.
There has been considerable donor investment in
generic IA tools for microfinance, notably those
developed by AIMS6 and MicroSave-Africa
(Simanowitz 2001). The Imp-Act programme seeks
to build on these, as well as to strengthen the
repertoire of methods for researching wider
impact. But given the heterogeneity of MFOs, and
their varied capacities, it is likely that a diverse
range of approaches will continue to be useful. This
section stops short of proposing a preferred list of
methods; rather, it offers a broader argument about
how IA is likely to be most cost-effective. It begins
by emphasising the link between IA and client
status monitoring. This leads to a strong argument
in favour of smaller and more flexible approaches.
A client status monitoring system provides an
essential foundation for IA for three reasons. First,
it provides a comprehensive profile of clients for
sample selection purposes. Second, systematic
reports of changes in selected indicators, such as
those illustrated by Table 4, generate hypotheses
for IA. Third, it facilitates judgements as to how
representative IA findings are likely to be. While
knowing who your clients are, and how this is
changing, is therefore a precondition for IA, it is
not in itself sufficient. This is because status
monitoring on its own does not explain why
changes have taken place, and how far they can be
attributed specifically to the MFO.
The monitoring system may be viewed as a
detection and alarm system. This corresponds to
the monitoring system already described, since this
can be used to reveal unexpected deviations from
expected patterns of change. For example, a
sudden increase in the share of clients falling into
Category C within groups managed by a particular
field officer might attract attention.
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The IA component of the system may be viewed as
an emergency response system. IA is commissioned
to explain unexpected events and deviations from
trends. In this case the fall in Category C clients
might be explained by poor classification by the
field officer. Alternatively, clients in her area may
have experienced an unexpected shock such as an
increase in local theft or a disease epidemic.
If the goal is to institutionalise ways to understand
impacts on different categories of client, then there
is a case for localised, quick and flexible methods,
rather than comprehensive but methodologically
indivisible survey-based methods.7 Nevertheless,
so long as care is taken in documenting sampling
methods and maintaining methodological
consistency it should also be possible to build up a
reasonable picture of impact across the whole
client population (see MkNelly et al. 2001 for
methods on qualitative sampling). Selecting a
random sample of all clients at the outset is
unlikely to be as efficient as selecting particular
groups of client for investigation sequentially. Each
round of detailed investigation is likely to be useful
in informing choice of the next group that should
be selected (Copestake 2002b).
While arguing for a relatively flexible system, there
is a strong case for including IA of both leavers and
stayers. Exit is itself often a powerful statement
about impact, and practical considerations also
affect how it can be organised. Copestake (2003a)
discusses different approaches.
Turning to consider IA of retained clients, a variety
of quantitative and qualitative methods are
available, and all that a benchmark should require
is that MFOs justify their particular preferences.
For most MFOs, the core tools are likely to be focus
groups, key informant interviews and mini-
surveys, for which AIMS and MicroSave-Africa
already provide generic protocols. Copestake,
Johnson and Wright (2003) suggest there is also a
need for a generic qualitative impact protocol
(QUIP) based on in-depth interviews.
There is again a tension here between flexibility
and consistency of approach. Technique is
important, but so are goals and scope. For
example, the best method, or mix of methods, will
depend upon whether the main source of demand
for impact data arises from a review of specific
product characteristics or wider strategic issues and
policies. It will also depend upon the prior
knowledge and understanding of the main target
audience, which will determine how rigorous and
comprehensive additional IA needs to be.
Therefore flexibility is very important. On the other
hand, consistency in use of methods and sampling
makes it easier to clarify the “big picture” when
combining information – ideally between MFOs as
well as within them (Copestake 2003b). It also
allows suppliers of IA data to develop expertise in
its production, and users to become more skilled in
its interpretation.
The size of the team dedicated to impact work can
be varied according to perceived need, with a work
programme comprising a mixture of ad hoc and
routine studies. Recruitment of additional
investigators to support core staff can take place as
required and as funding permits. A strong internal
supervisory group is also essential to monitor
outputs of the team and to direct its work
priorities. This leads on to the issue of performance
management, or how impact monitoring and
assessment data is used.
5. Performance management 
This section starts by exploring why making
effective use of impact data is not always easy. It
then suggests that external stakeholders have an
important role to play in overcoming some of the
difficulties and suggests that a step in the right
direction would be routine social performance
auditing.
Assessing net worth to clients is not an end in itself,
but a means for informing decisions about whether
services can be improved. Perhaps the greatest
weakness of IA in the past has been a failure to
institutionalise the feedback loop whereby findings
inform the organisational goals, policies and
practices. This section first discusses internal
performance management, then broadens the
discussion to include the role of external
stakeholders.
Breakdown in the feedback loop often arises from
the failure to analyse data in a way that generates
information that is sufficiently succinct and timely
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to influence decisions (McCord 2002; Imp-Act
2003). This has often been borne of lack of
experience, leading to over-ambitious studies that
underestimate the cost and methodological
complexity of the task. Another common problem
is failure to budget sufficient resources for
discussion of findings and piloting of possible
responses. However, these bottlenecks are
themselves often a symptom of deeper issues. Most
importantly, a necessary precondition for effective
social performance management is a commitment
to it on the part of MFO leadership (article 9, this
Bulletin).
If an MFO is struggling to survive at all then social
performance management is almost inevitably
relegated to financial performance management.
Reliable feedback may also limit its room for
manoeuvre. It may be safer to hide behind weaker
but bolder claims to positive impact that conform
to what donors also want to hear in order to
disburse funds. Improving the quality of IA is risky,
because it may reveal social performance that falls
short of MFO and donor rhetoric, and it is safer to
rely on informal information that can, if necessary,
be “buried” (Martens et al. 2002). This is not to
accuse MFO leaders of acting cynically. Rather, I
think they often hesitate to invest more heavily in
such work because they doubt that the additional
insights they expect to gain will justify the cost.
The result can then be a vicious circle: low
management expectations of IA result in poor
studies, and these reinforce the low expectations.
Public sponsorship of such work offers a potential
way out of this funding trap, but also introduces a
new problem. This is that conditions attached to IA
divert it from models that serve MFOs’ own
management interests. The solution to this
problem is then for subsidies to be subordinated to
implementation of MFO leaders’ own social
performance management agenda. This requires a
risky power reversal which may be closed off by
donors’ own bureaucratic structures of
accountability (Grammig 2002). On the other
hand, if successful, such reversals can also have
positive feedback effects: good IA-improving social
performance, making good social performance
even easier to measure. This can also encourage
greater transparency, enhance theMFO’s reputation
and make it easier to mobilise resources.
It follows from the above that organisations
committed to finding such positive social
performance spirals should be interested in
developing internal quality assurance mechanisms.
An important issue here is the division of labour for
such “higher loop” organisational learning between
operational and specialist staff. The latter are
needed to ensure that the task is not buried, but the
need for realism and ownership of the process
require that such specialists also have to work
closely with other staff (Edwards 1997; Copestake
2000).
The work of specialist units can also be the core
contact point for independent auditors. This is also
likely to be a more cost-effective approach to
auditing than the traditional independent IA study.
The idea of a periodic social performance audit is
currently underdeveloped, yet corresponds more
closely to that adopted for validating financial
performance (Cheston and Reed 1999).8
Ideas for elaborating on the idea can also be drawn
in part from the experience of social ethical
accounting (Zadek and Raynard 1995).9
Experience with institutional auditing, or external
reviewing of management structures and systems
are also relevant (see USAID 2000). However, the
proposal for social performance auditing is
narrower in its focus on clients rather than other
stakeholders, and on outcomes rather than internal
processes. As such there may be an even closer link
to be forged between the idea and growing interest
in developingMFO codes for consumer protection,
since the process of assessing impact on clients is
closely linked to the extent of their prior
understanding of the services they use. This is
particularly important for an industry that enters
into quite complex and open-ended contracts with
often poor and weakly informed clients, who may
have a quite limited understanding of such
fundamental concepts as interest rates.
There are at least four elements to implementing
the idea of social performance auditing. First, there
is a need to agree on a social performance
benchmark. This article argues for a very simple
standard that boils down to reviewing internal
processes of goal setting, client status monitoring,
IA and quality assurance.
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A second element is development of a protocol for
the process of conducting a social performance
audit to check how far an MFO complies with its
own guidelines. The protocol might include steps
for:
n reviewing documentation about the
organisation and its internal social
performance monitoring system;
n interviewing staff at all levels of theMFO about
how this system is utilised in practice;
n sampling and testing the validity of data
generated by the system;
n assessing how information is actually used,
using a framework similar to the feedback
loop, but applied to the whole performance
management system rather than to one study.
The third element is the establishment of national
and international pools of social performance
auditors willing and able to carry out such audits.
The reputation of such auditors would serve in no
small measure to validate the process.
Finally, MFOs and their sponsors need to be
convinced of the potential value of such audits.
Further work is needed to develop the idea of
social performance audits, building on these ideas
and drawing further on lessons learnt from closely
related activities, including experience with gender
and poverty audits, institutional assessment,
financial audits and inspections by regulators. Such
work needs to be participatory, reflecting the
interest and character of different kinds of MFO
and stakeholders. Hence MFO networks are likely
to play an important role, and in some cases
particular networks may be able to raise the stakes
by agreeing on standards that are more detailed
and specific than the one proposed here.
6. Conclusions
By way of conclusion, the main arguments of this
article can be quickly summarised.
1. There is a case for developing a standard for
MFO social performance assessment, so long as it
is simple. More specifically, this article suggests
that all MFOs should have formal responses to the
following questions:
(a) What are your social performance goals and
what indicators do you use to monitor progress
towards these?
(b) How do you monitor the status of clients?
(c) How do you assess the impact of the services
you provide on loyal and exiting clients?
(d) How do you review and seek to improve on the
way social performance assessment affects
MFO policies and practice?
2. It would be useful for MFOs to agree on a
common typology of social goals. This should
distinguish (a) between breadth/scale, depth and
quality of outreach; and (b) between income
poverty, non-income poverty, other client level
goals, and wider goals.
3. The key to institutionalising client status
monitoring is routine production of simple
reporting tables that reveal mobility of clients
between a relatively small number of categories,
while at the same time taking into account new
entry and exit.
4. Impact assessment should be (a) integrated
closely with client status monitoring, and (b) based
on a continuous, flexible and divisible programme
of data collection, analysis and reporting.
5. Internal quality assurance systems should be
underpinned by independent social performance
auditing.
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Notes
1. I am grateful to several participants at the Imp-Act
programme for comments on earlier drafts,
particularly Anup Dash, Chris Dunford, Susan
Johnson, Graham Wright and Alyson Brody.
2. Organisations, including MFOs are defined here as
legal entities or agencies. Institutions are defined as
durable rules and norms governing how people
behave. To become an institution, a rule or norm of
behaviour (such as charging interest on loans) must
be accepted across a community – such as the
microfinance industry. The distinction between
organisations and institutions is useful and well
established within the social sciences, if not in the
world of microfinance. 
3. In practice, scope of outreach refers to relatively
superficial indicators of service use, such as accounts
held, and loans received. More detailed and
ambiguous aspects of scope, such as internal
accounts obtained within a village bank are
considered under net worth.
4. Strictly it is the $1.08 dollar a day per person
yardstick at 1993 purchasing power parity exchange
rates.
5. CASHPOR (Credit and Savings for the Hard-Core
Poor of Asia-Pacific) is an association of Grameen
bank replications in Asia.
6. AIMS (Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise
Services) is a USAID-sponsored research project in
microfinance impact assessment. A manual of five
tools for use by practitioners was produced by the
project in collaboration with the US Microenterprise
Network, SEEP.
7. Methodological indivisibility refers to the problem
that attribution of impact based solely on statistical
analysis of client and control groups requires a
minimum sample size and research effort. In
contrast, focus groups and in-depth interviews
address the attribution issue mainly through
interpretation of the consistency of multiple sources
of data (see Copestake et al. 2001).
8. Indeed the two may be inseparable to the extent that
some form of social audit is necessary in order to
assess client loyalty. For example, DAI/FINNET
(2002: 1) note that current financial audits are often
very weak in their assessment of loan portfolio
quality.
9. Zadek and Raynard reviewed three emerging
approaches: Social Auditing as developed by Traidcraft
and the New Economics Foundation in the UK; Ethical
Accounting as developed by SBN Bank and
Copenhagen Business School, and Social Assessment,
developed in the USA with the company Ben& Jerry’s.
All three elicited the views of ‘multiple stakeholders’,
favoured a regular (annual) audit cycle and
publication of findings. Other elements discussed
include ensuring auditing is comprehensive, use of
external benchmarks, target setting, systematic book-
keeping, and external verification.
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